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Sammendrag 
Vi studerer et internasjonalt system for handel med klimakvoter som omfatter enkelte sektorer av 
økonomien i noen store, utvalgte land. En utvidelse av systemet til å omfatte flere regioner og sektorer 
medfører generelt lavere totalkostnader ved å nå et gitt utslippsmål, men enkeltland kan tape på en slik 
utvidelse. Vi simulerer et internasjonalt marked for klimakvoter, der vi legger til grunn landenes 
rapporterte klimamålsettinger etter klimatoppmøtet i København. Vi antar at landene fordeler sine 
utslippskvoter strategisk mellom sektorer som er omfattet av kvotemarkedet og sektorer som ikke er 
omfattet. Dette gjør de med tanke på å påvirke prisen på kvoter. Eksportører og importører av kvoter 
har generelt motstridende interesser når det gjelder å invitere nye land til å delta i kvotemarkedet, og 
resultatene våre tyder på at noen land kan oppleve betydelig høyere kostnader ved å nå klimamålet sitt 
når kvotemarkedet utvides med nye land. Å utvide kvotesystemet til å omfatte flere sektorer er gunstig 
for de fleste land, men noen land (spesielt USA og Russland) kan komme dårligere ut på grunn av 
mindre strategisk innflytelse. Generelt finner vi at eksportører av kvoter har sterkere strategisk makt 
enn importører. 
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1. Introduction 
International emissions trading is considered a key instrument to combat global warming because it 
promotes cost-effectiveness of emission abatement and thereby increases political feasibility of 
stringent emission reduction objectives. 
 
Since 2005 the EU has been a forerunner in the implementation and operation of a multi-jurisdictional 
emissions trading scheme. While the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) has been critically 
observed as a “New Grand Experiment” (Kruger and Pizer, 2004) in the early stage, it is meanwhile 
perceived as a success story which could be the nucleus for a gradually expanding system towards 
global coverage (Convery, 2009). As a matter of fact, the EU strongly pushes policy initiatives to link 
the EU ETS with other regional greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems outside the EU (EU, 2007).1  
 
With respect to cost-effectiveness of emission abatement, an important characteristic of the EU ETS is 
its incomplete coverage. The EU ETS focuses on energy-intensive installations and thereby covers 
only around 40% of the EU-wide greenhouse gas emissions. To achieve its reduction target of 20% by 
2020 (compared to 1990 emission levels), the EU must undertake complementary regulation of 
emission sources outside the EU ETS. The segmentation of emission regulation into one EU-wide 
ETS market and multiple national non-ETS markets has given rise to concerns on adverse implications 
for cost-effectiveness of EU emission abatement: While the allocation of emission allowances across 
sources would not matter for cost-effectiveness in the case of comprehensive trading, it may induce 
substantial additional costs of emission abatement in the case of unlinked markets should the regulator 
not be able or willing to choose the cost-effective split of the emission budget between ETS and non-
ETS segments (see e.g. Böhringer et al., 2005).2  
 
Even in the case of perfect planner information the segmentation of regional emissions into an 
international ETS market and unconnected non-ETS markets can have adverse efficiency implications 
as regions obtain incentives to manipulate emission prices through strategic segmentation (Böhringer 
and Rosendahl, 2009): Importers of emission allowances have incentives to over-allocate emissions to 
the international ETS in order to lower the emission price whereas exporters of emission allowances 
would like to do the opposite.3 Each country would then trade off the benefits from price manipulation 
                                                     
1 For example, RGGI and WCI in the USA, GGAS in Australia, or JVETS in Japan (for an overview see Schüle and Sterk, 
2009). 
2 Note that we use the terms “allowances”, “permits” and “quotas” interchangeably throughout the paper. 
3 The mechanism is similar to the “optimal tariff” argument (e.g. Bhagwati et al., 1998, Ch. 21). 
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with the costs of driving apart the marginal abatement cost between the ETS and their domestic non-
ETS emission sources.  
 
For the first two phases of the EU ETS (2005-2007 and 2008-2012), each Member State had to submit 
a National Allocation Plan to the European Commission, detailing how many emissions allowances of 
the national budget under the Kyoto Protocol are allocated to its ETS sectors and how these 
allowances are spread across the ETS sectors. For the third phase of the EU ETS (2013-2020), the 
National Allocation Plans will be replaced by an EU-wide cap for ETS sectors with harmonized 
allocation rules. The determination of the allowance allocation is then completely out of the hands of 
the individual Member States avoiding incentives for strategic partitioning. However, if other 
countries outside the EU start joining the trading scheme, the EU as a whole as well as the joining 
countries might still want to set their allocation strategically. 
 
The strategic incentives in a hybrid regulation scheme where countries can divide up national emission 
budgets between international trading sectors and domestically ruled sectors provide the conceptual 
background for our analysis. Given the wide-spread policy interest in expanding the EU ETS towards 
a global emissions trading system, we investigate the prospects for sectoral and regional expansion 
when countries decide strategically on how to allocate their emission budget. Can we expect that the 
EU ETS will be easily expanded to include more regions and sectors, thereby increasing overall cost-
effectiveness of emission reductions? If self-interests of regions impede more comprehensive 
coverage, how severe are the foregone gains in aggregate cost savings?  
 
For answering these questions we complement basic theoretical analysis with numerical simulations 
on international CO2 emission quota markets using sector- and region-specific (marginal) abatement 
cost functions. As to regional coverage, we point out that quota exporters and importers tend to have 
conflicting interests about admitting more countries to the trading coalition. When expanding sectoral 
coverage, the bulk of potential cost reductions is achieved in the first step: going from “No trade” to a 
trading scheme that includes one sector with a sufficiently large emission share (in our case: the 
electricity sector). Most countries gain from sectoral expansion; however, we identify several cases in 
our applied analysis where countries might lose. The latter occurs if sectoral expansion makes the 
marginal abatement costs in the remaining non-trading sectors of these countries less elastic, so that 
they are less able to manipulate the quota price in their preferred direction. The economic implications 
of sectoral expansion are more significant when only few countries take part in the emissions trading 
coalition, because an individual country has more market power in a smaller coalition. The quota price 
6 
for partial sectoral coverage is higher under strategic allowance allocation than in a competitive setting 
but sectoral expansion reduces the quota price (in most of the simulations). Exporters thus have more 
market power than importers, but their influence decreases when more sectors are added to the trading 
scheme. The reasoning behind this result is twofold. Firstly, as will be shown in our theoretical 
analysis for the case of symmetric countries, convex marginal abatement cost functions imply that it is 
less costly for exporters to over-supply their non-trading sectors than for importers to under-supply 
their non-trading sector. Secondly, as will be evident from our applied policy analysis, exporters are 
often bigger countries than importers, and thus have stronger market power. 
 
The seminal study on market power in markets of transferable property rights is Hahn (1984). 
Assuming a single firm has market power, he demonstrates that the inefficiency of the permit market 
increases as the number of permits allocated to this firm deviates further from the amount it uses in the 
competitive equilibrium. Hahn’s (1984) model has been extended by Westskog (1996) to allow for 
several dominant firms and by Malueg and Yates (2009a) to allow for market power by all firms. 
Maeda (2003) analyzes a permit market consisting of one large buyer, one large seller and many price-
taking parties. He finds that the large seller has effective market power if and only if the volume of its 
excess permits exceeds the net shortage of permits in the market. The large buyer cannot have 
effective market power. 
 
In common with our paper, Helm (2003) models the endogenous choice of emission allowances by non-
cooperative countries for a global pollutant in regimes with and without permit trading. The major 
difference from our paper is that Helm assumes that each country can choose its own national emission 
target strategically while the permit trading regime covers all sectors of the economy in all countries. 
Helm shows that environmentally less (more) concerned countries tend to choose more (fewer) 
allowances if these are tradable. The effect on overall emissions of introducing permit trade is 
ambiguous. Individual countries may lose from emissions trading if total emissions increase. In our 
paper, by contrast, international emissions trading always increases the welfare of the country joining the 
trading coalition, because each country's emissions target remains fixed at an exogenous policy level (in 
our case provided by official emission reduction pledges of countries up to 2020). Godal and Holtsmark 
(2010) show, within a similar context as Helm (2003), that if countries can tax domestic emissions, 
allowing for permit trade does not change emission levels as countries re-adjust domestic tax rates. 
 
Babiker et al. (2004) illustrate in a computable general equilibrium analysis that countries exporting 
emission permits may lose from joining an international emissions trading scheme if efficiency costs 
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associated with the pre-existing distortionary taxes are larger than the primary gains from emissions 
trading. Similarly, Böhringer et al. (2008) and Eichner and Pethig (2009) point to potentially large 
efficiency losses from the imposition of emission taxes in sectors that are covered by the EU ETS 
whenever tax rates differ across trading regions. 
 
Finally let us review the theoretical and empirical literature analyzing international emissions trading 
schemes that only covers a part of all polluting sectors (like the EU ETS). Malueg and Yates (2009b) 
compare centralized and decentralized emission allocations under perfect and under asymmetric 
information from an economic efficiency perspective. They find that if countries do not behave strategi-
cally, the permit market should be decentralized (whether there is full or asymmetric information). If 
they do behave strategically, however, then either centralization or decentralization might be preferred. 
 
Dijkstra et al. (2011) examine in a theoretical framework whether a country could lose when the 
international trading scheme expands to cover more sectors. They find that if the expansion results in a 
country’s marginal abatement cost curve for the remaining non-trading sectors becoming much 
steeper, this country will lose its ability to manipulate the international permit price in its favor, and 
may thus see its overall cost increase.4  
 
In an empirical application, Bernard et al. (2004) use a computable general equilibrium model 
(GEMINI-E3) to investigate the economic impacts of market power in emissions trading for the EU-
15. They identify three major players: Germany operates as a potential seller while Italy and the 
Netherlands are assumed to collude as potential buyers. The three countries' deviations from the 
competitive allocation are rather negligible, however, as are the associated overall welfare losses. 
Using the same model, Viguier et al. (2006) show that EU Member States with high abatement costs 
could be tempted to give a generous initial allocation of allowances to their energy-intensive 
industries; yet, the economic incentives to act strategically are relatively small. 
 
Böhringer and Rosendahl (2009) quantify the implications of strategic emission allocation between 
trading and non-trading sectors for the EU-27. They find that strategic behavior leads to substantial 
differentiation of marginal abatement costs across EU Member States in the non-trading sectors. 
However, the effects of strategic allowance allocation on the quota price and total abatement costs are 
quite modest.  
 
                                                     
4 We will illustrate this point in Section 2. 
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The present paper provides an extension to the theoretical analysis by Dijkstra et al. (2008) and the 
numerical study by Böhringer and Rosendahl (2009). We consider the effects of both regional and 
sectoral coverage. Beyond addressing a larger variety of sectoral coverage, we investigate the impacts 
of strategic allowance allocation within a global setting featuring all major climate policy players. 
Furthermore, we show analytically that exporters tend to have stronger strategic power than importers 
which helps us to explain the policy-relevant outcome of our numerical simulations. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a stylized theoretical 
framework to study key mechanisms of strategic allowance allocation in multi-sector, multi-region 
emission markets. Then in section 3 we lay out the structure and the data for our numerical model in 
use for applied policy analysis. In section 4 we describe our policy scenarios and provide an economic 
interpretation of the simulation results. Finally, in section 5 we conclude. 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
We use the same analytical model as in Dijkstra et al. (2008) and Böhringer and Rosendahl (2009). 
Let there be n countries, i = 1,…,n. Country i has an exogenously given emission ceiling Ei. In policy 
practice, the latter could reflect legally binding commitments such as the Kyoto targets or prospective 
Post-Kyoto pledges such as the national communications to the Copenhagen Accords (UNFCCC, 
2009 – cf. section 3). The main point in our context is that the total ceiling is assumed to be unaffected 
by sectoral or regional expansions of the emissions trading scheme. Polluters in each country are 
divided into a trading segment T and a non-trading segment NT.5 The rules according to which 
polluters (or polluting activities) are divided into the two segments are exogenous. Total abatement 
costs of reducing emissions from business-as-usual to the emission level ei,T in country i’s trading 
segment are Ci,T(ei,T), with marginal abatement costs MCi,T positive (MCi,T ≡ –C′i,T(ei,T) > 0) and 
decreasing in emissions (–C′′i,T(ei,T) < 0). Total abatement costs of emissions ei,NT in the non-trading 
segment of country i are Ci,NT(ei,NT), again with MCi,NT ≡ –C′i,NT(ei,NT) > 0, –C′′i,NT(ei,NT) < 0.  
 
When there is an international permit trading scheme, the polluters in the trading segment can trade 
internationally with each other, but the polluters in the non-trading segment cannot. We assume that 
firms that do not trade permits internationally can be regulated efficiently at the domestic level such 
that all firms within a country have the same marginal abatement costs. The latter could be achieved 
through a domestic trading scheme or a domestic emission tax for the non-trading segment. 
                                                     
5 In line with our previous discussion, the segment T obviously comprises the ETS sectors while the segment NT covers the 
non-ETS sectors. Throughout the theoretical considerations we keep with notations T and NT for the sake of brevity. 
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Let us start with the benchmark case NTR in which there is no international emissions trading. Each 
country i has to decide how to divide its total emission ceiling Ei between the trading and the non-
trading segment. It allocates ei,T > 0 emissions to the trading segment and the rest ei,NT = Ei – ei,T > 0 to 
the non-trading segment. Each country i minimizes total costs of abatement: 
(1) ( ) ( ), , , ,Min i T i T i NT i i TC e C E e + −   
Let ,
NTR
i Te  be the emissions allocated to and taking place in the trading segment without international 
emissions trading. From (1), ,
NTR
i Te  is given by the well-known first-order condition: 
 
(2) ( ) ( ), , , ,NTR NTRi T i T i NT i i TMC e MC E e= −  
 
Figure 1 shows country i’s marginal abatement costs MCi,T as a function of emissions ei,T in the trading 
segment, measured from left to right. Further, the figure shows the country’s marginal abatement costs 
MCi,NT as a function of emissions ei,NT in the non-trading segment, measured from right to left. The 
national ceiling is given by the distance OEi. Without international trading, country i sets MCi,T = 
MCi,NT by (2), so that emissions in the trading segment are ,
NTR
i Te  and marginal costs in both segments 
are NTRiP .  
 
Figure 1: The switch from no international emissions trading to competitive trade 
O
MC
MC
i,T
i,NT
ei,T ei,NTei,TC qiC
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ei,TNTR
PNTR
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With international emissions trading, country i's trading segment emissions ei,T will in general differ 
from the emissions budget qi allocated to the trading segment by country i's emission authority.6 The 
allocated emissions budget qi for the trading segment plus emissions ei,NT for the non-trading segment 
must add up to the national ceiling Ei. After each country has set its qi and distributed the permits 
among its trading segment, the polluters in the trading segments trade the permits among each other. 
We assume that each individual polluter is too small to have market power, and so each polluter takes 
the permit price P as given. Emissions ei,T are then determined by: 
(3) ( ), ,i T i TMC e P=  
under the restriction: 
(4) ,
1 1
n n
T j T j
j j
e e q
= =
≡ =   
 
That is, marginal abatement costs equal the permit price, and total emissions in all trading segments 
equal the total amount of permits for the trading segments. Equations (3) and (4) implicitly define P 
and ei,T as function of the total emissions eT in the trading segment with: 
 
(5)  
 
 
Country i now chooses qi to minimize overall abatement costs in the trading and non-trading segments 
plus net expenditures on buying (selling) permits from (to) abroad: 
(6) 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,Min ( )i T i T i NT i i T i T iC e C E q P e e q + − + ⋅ −   
 
Assuming an interior solution 0 < qi < 0,i Te ,
7 the first-order condition, taking (3) into account, is: 
(7) ( ), , ,( ) ( ) '( ) ( )i NT i NT i i T T i T iMC e MR q P e P e e q= ≡ − ⋅ −  
                                                     
6 It makes no difference to our analysis whether the national government auctions or grandfathers the permits to its firms, or 
(in the latter case) how it distributes the permits among its firms. This is because we assume the permit market is perfectly 
competitive for firms, and because we are only interested in the welfare of the country as a whole. 
7 In the numerical simulations (cf. section 4) there is one occasion (Brazil in region coverage variant C4 and sector coverage 
variant ELE) where qi = 0, as the optimal allocation is negative. Then marginal costs in the non-trading segment are above the 
marginal revenue, and we have an inequality in (7). We assume that countries are not allowed to overallocate, i.e., to allocate 
more allowances to the trading segment than their business-as-usual emissions in that segment (qi ≤ 0,i Te ). However, this 
restriction is never binding in the numerical simulations. 
 
( )1 , ,
1'( ) 1
''
T n
j
j T j T
P e
C e=
=−
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where P'(eT) is given by (5) and MRi(qi) is country i’s marginal revenue of allocating more permits to 
its trading segment. When country i is exporting permits, its marginal revenues are below the 
international permit price (as for any seller with market power), because the extra permits it allocates 
to its trading segment depress the price at which it can sell permits. Correspondingly, when country i 
is importing permits, its marginal revenues exceed the permit price. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how a country gains when it joins the international emissions trading 
scheme. First consider the change from no international trading to competitive international trade 
where country i takes the international permit price PC as given. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where 
we have assumed CP  > NTRiP . The country then minimizes overall costs by setting its marginal costs 
in the non-trading segment equal to CP , as is clear from (7) with P' = 0. Thus, it allocates Ciq  permits 
to its trading segment and the rest ( Ci iE q− ) to its non-trading segment. Firms in country i’s trading 
segment trade permits and emit ,
C
i Te  themselves, which in the Figure 1 is lower than 
C
iq  since 
CP  > 
NTR
iP . Compared to the case without international emissions trading, country i’s total costs have 
decreased by the shaded triangle above the MC-curves and below the CP -line, i.e., export revenues 
minus increased abatement costs. 
 
Figure 2: The switch from competitive trade to trade with market power 
 
O 
MC 
MC 
P(q ) 
MR (q ) 
i,T 
i,NT 
ei,T 
i i 
i 
ei,T ei,TM C qiM qiC
P 
P 
M 
C 
ei,NT Ei 
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Figure 2 illustrates the switch from competitive trade to trade with market power.8 As before, the 
international permit price will be CP  if the country issues Ciq  permits to its trading segment. 
However, the permit price is now a decreasing function P(qi) of qi. Country i’s marginal revenue 
MRi(qi) curve is located below (above) P(qi) when it is exporting (importing) permits. We know from 
(7) that country i will set its marginal abatement costs in the non-trading segment equal to the 
marginal revenues from selling permits (or buying less permits) in the international market. It thus 
reduces its permit allocation to the trading segment to Miq , driving the permit price up to 
MP  in 
Figure 2. The trading segment will now emit ,
M
i Te , whereas the non-trading segment increases its 
emissions to (Ei – Miq ). The cost reduction compared to competitive behavior is the difference between 
the light-shaded quadrangle and the dark-shaded triangle. The quadrangle represents the gain from 
selling permits at a higher price. The triangle represents the efficiency loss from the domestic 
distortion of letting MCi,NT deviate from the permit price.9  
 
So far we have illustrated that a country gains when joining the international emissions trading scheme 
while taking the permit price as given, and that there is an additional gain should it be able to influence 
the permit price. It is easily seen that the costs of all participating countries together are minimized 
when all sectors are included in the international trading scheme.10 In this case there is no scope for 
countries to manipulate the permit price by letting marginal cost in their non-trading segment deviate 
from the international permit price. 
 
However, a country will not necessarily benefit from the inclusion of additional sectors into the 
international trading scheme. The discussion of Figure 2 indicates that the permit price for strategic 
allowance allocation in general will deviate from the cost-effective solution as long as the trading 
scheme only covers a subset of all sectors. Including more and more sectors into the trading segment 
changes a country’s ability to manipulate the permit price. If a country sees the permit price move in 
an adverse direction (up for a net importer, down for a net exporter), its loss from this price change 
may dominate the gain from increased where-flexibility, so that overall the country may lose from the 
sectoral expansion of the trading scheme. 
                                                     
8 We assume throughout that all reaction curves are downward sloping (i.e., dqi /dqj < 0 for all i,j), and that there is a stable 
and unique Nash equilibrium. 
9 Obviously, strategic allowance allocation provides additional cost savings for the joining country compared to competitive 
behaviour, i.e., the difference between the light-shaded quadrangle and the dark-shaded triangle must be positive. 
10 We abstract from transaction costs which may be prohibitively high for the large group of small polluters. Betz et al. 
(2010) discuss the optimal coverage of the EU ETS, taking transaction costs into account. 
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A country’s ability to manipulate the permit price depends on the slope of its marginal abatement cost 
curve for the non-trading segment. Consider the marginal cost curve for the non-trading segment, 
MCi,NT, in Figure 2. This curve is rather flat. Suppose that country i had a much steeper MCi,NT curve 
which likewise intersects the P(qi) curve at Ciq . The country would still issue 
C
iq  permits to the trading 
segment if it took the permit price CP  as given. However, its domestic efficiency loss (i.e., the shaded 
triangle) from reducing the number of permits to the trading segment to Miq  would now be larger. 
Thus, the country would go less far in reducing the number of permits in order to drive up the permit 
price, and so the dark-shaded quadrangle would decrease. Thus, the flatter a country’s marginal 
abatement cost curve in the non-trading segment is, the stronger is the incentive to manipulate the 
permit price.11 If an expansion of the trading scheme makes a country’s marginal abatement costs in 
the remaining non-trading segment much steeper, i.e., less elastic, this country will lose its ability to 
manipulate the permit price in its favor and may see its overall costs increase as a result of the 
expansion. 
 
Before turning to the numerical analysis, let us briefly summarize what results we may expect based 
on the theoretical discussion so far. First, we should expect larger countries to have stronger impacts 
on the permit price than smaller countries. A large country would typically have a larger volume of net 
trade and therefore a larger benefit from a permit price change. Second, we laid out that a country’s 
incentive to manipulate the international permit price increases with the flatness of the marginal 
abatement cost curve in its non-trading segment.  
 
Furthermore, we should expect exporters to have more strategic power than importers, given that 
marginal abatement costs are strictly convex.12 That is, the permit price will tend to be above the 
competitive or cost-effective permit price as long as sectoral coverage is partial. Formally, we can 
state:  
Proposition: 
Consider n countries with different national emissions targets, having a common trading scheme that 
covers a subset of all sectors. Assume that countries freely decide on their permit allocation, and play 
Nash in the allocation game. Assume also that marginal abatement cost curves in the non-trading 
                                                     
11 A flat marginal cost curve implies only a small cost of letting the permit allocation deviate from the point where marginal 
costs equal the permit price. 
12 In our quantitative analysis based on empirical data the aggregate marginal abatement cost functions for the non-trading 
segment is always strictly convex for any country.  
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sectors are convex and identical across countries. Then the emissions price in the trading scheme will 
be above the cost-effective emissions price level. 
Proof:  
Note that equation (7) implies: 
(8) 
( )( ), ,
1
1 n
j NT j NT
j
P MC e
n
=
= 
 
In the cost-effective solution, marginal abatement costs are equal across countries and equal to the 
permit price. Moreover, since the countries have identical marginal cost functions in the non-trading 
sectors, their emissions in the non-trading segment are identical in the cost-effective solution, and an 
identical change in emissions will obviously have identical effects on the marginal abatement costs. 
Let Δ denote differences between the Nash equilibrium and the cost-effective solution. In the Nash 
equilibrium, exporters allocate less permits to the trading segment (Δ Eiq  < 0), whereas importers 
allocate more permits (Δ Iiq  > 0). Assume now that ∑Δqi ≥ 0. Then we know that ΔP ≤ 0. However, 
∑Δqi ≥ 0 also implies that total emissions in the non-trading segments of importers must decrease at 
least as much as the total increase in emissions in the non-trading segments of exporters. But then it 
follows from the assumed convexity of the marginal abatement cost functions that the right-hand side 
of equation (8) strictly increases, which contradicts ΔP ≤ 0. Thus, the permit price will tend to increase 
compared to the cost-effective price, as exporters in general have stronger strategic power than 
importers.  ■  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the proposition for a trading scheme between two countries, with country 1 being 
the net exporter and country 2 the net importer. Country 1 (2) has a national emission ceiling of O1E 
(O2E). Country 1 (2)’s emissions in the trading sector e1,T (e2,T) are measured from left to right starting 
from O1 (O2). Country 1 (2)’s marginal abatement costs in the trading segment are given by MC1,T 
(MC2,T). Country i’s (i = 1,2) emissions in the non-trading sector ei,NT are measured from right to left 
starting from E. Both countries have the same marginal abatement cost curves in the non-trading 
segment (as represented by MCi,NT in Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: The effect of a convex MCi,NT curve 
 
 
In the cost-effective outcome, all marginal abatement costs are equal to each other at PC with 
emissions eCE for the non-trading segment in each country. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, it 
follows from (7) that: 
(9) ( ) ( )1, 1 1, 2, 2 2,' 'NT NT NT NTP MC P q e P e q MC P− = − − = − − = −  
 
The second and third term in equation (9) represent country 1 and 2’s marginal benefits of letting their 
marginal abatement costs in the non-trading segment deviate from the international permit price. The 
marginal benefits consist of a favorable price change for the internationally traded amount of permits. 
These marginal benefits are always equal for both countries, because country 1’s exports are country 
2’s imports. The first and fourth term in equation (9) are country 1 and 2’s marginal costs of the 
domestic distortion from letting marginal abatement cost in the non-trading segment deviate from P. 
In equilibrium these should also equal each other. 
 
Now let us examine whether the cost-effective price PC in Figure 3 could also be the equilibrium 
permit price in equation (9). Buyer country 2 tries to decrease the permit price by allocating more 
permits than O2eC to its trading segment and less than eCE emissions to its non-trading segment. Let us 
assume that country 2 allocates O2q2 to its trading segment and q2E to its non-trading segment. Then to 
keep the permit price at PC, country 1 would have to allocate 11
~qO to its trading segment and Eq1~ to 
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its non-trading segment. This is because the distance Ceq1~  equals 2qe
C , so that the total amount 
allocated to the non-trading segment (and thereby the total amount allocated to the trading segment) 
remains the same. However, the gap between the permit price PC and the marginal abatement cost 
MCi,NT is now much smaller for country 1 than for country 2,13 because the MCi,NT curve is strictly 
convex. According to equation (9), these gaps, which measure the marginal costs of the domestic 
distortion, should be the same for both countries. Hence, exporting country 1 will further restrict its 
permit allocation to the trading segment. In equilibrium, country 1 allocates O1q1 to its trading sector 
and q1E to its non-trading sector, while country 2 allocates O2q2 and q2E respectively. Total emissions 
in the trading segment are lower than in the cost-effective outcome, so that the permit price is now PM, 
which exceeds the cost-effective price PC. The two countries then have the same gap between the 
permit price PM and the marginal abatement cost MCi,NT, i.e., equal marginal costs of domestic 
distortion, as required by (9).14  
3. Numerical Model and Benchmark Data 
In order to investigate the prospects for expanding the EU ETS towards a more comprehensive 
coverage of sectors and regions we make use of a numerical carbon market model. The model is based 
on marginal abatement cost curves which reflect differences in emission reduction possibilities across 
sectors and regions. We can generate these cost functions in continuous form given a sufficiently large 
number of discrete observations for marginal abatement costs and the induced emission reductions in 
sectors and regions. In applied research marginal abatement costs are often provided as discrete step-
functions where the data is either collected through expert assessments of abatement possibilities or 
generated through bottom-up models of the energy system (e.g., Criqui and Mima, 2001; Capros et al., 
1998). Another wide-spread method is to derive marginal abatement costs curves from economy-wide 
models with a top-down representation of emission reduction possibilities in production and 
consumption (see, e.g., Eyckmans et al., 2001).  
 
As our numerical analysis requires marginal abatement cost curves for many sectors and regions, a 
bottom-up approach is not practical. We therefore employ an established multi-sector, multi-region 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy (see Böhringer and Rutherford, 
2010, for a recent detailed model description) to obtain explicit reduced-form representations of 
                                                     
13 In Figure 3, the gaps are given by the dark thick vertical line above 1
~q for country 1 and the grey plus the dark thick 
vertical lines above q2 for country 2. 
14 The gap between the international permit price and marginal abatement cost in the non-trading segment is given by the 
dark thick vertical lines above q1 and q2 respectively.  
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marginal abatement cost curves. The CGE model is based on the GTAP7 dataset for 2004 which 
features consistent accounts of production and consumption, bilateral trade and energy (carbon 
emission) flows for 57 sectors and 113 regions (Badri and Walmsley, 2008) and is complemented with 
econometric estimates on sector-specific elasticities of substitution (Okagawa and Ban, 2008). Since 
our numerical simulations refer to 2020 as the central compliance year for a potential Post-Kyoto 
agreement, we perform a business-as-usual forward projection of the model to 2020 based on 
information of the International Energy Outlook (EIA, 2010). We aggregate the GTAP7 dataset 
towards a more compact representation with 9 sectors and 13 regions. Table 1 provides a summary of 
explicit sectors and regions incorporated in our numerical analysis.  
 
Table 1: Model sectors and regions 
Sectors and commodities  Countries and regions 
Energy  Annex B regions  
 Coal (COL)   EU-27 (EUR) 
 Crude oil (CRU)   USA (USA) 
 Natural gas (GAS)   Canada (CAN) 
 Refined oil products (OIL)   Japan (JPN) 
 Electricity (ELE)   Russian Federation (RUS) 
   Australia (AUS) 
Non-energy  Non-Annex B regions 
Energy-intensive industries (EIS)a   Mexico (MEX) 
Other transport (OTP)b   South Korea (KOR) 
Water transport (WTP)   China (CHN) 
Rest of industry (ROI)   India (IND) 
Final demand (C)   Brazil (BRA) 
   South Africa (ZAF) 
   Rest of the World (ROW) 
a EIS composite includes chemical industry, mineral products, non-ferrous metals, iron and steel industry, paper, pulp and 
print, as well as air transport (i.e., the non-energy EU ETS sectors). 
b OTP mainly includes road transport 
The sectors include primary and secondary energy goods (coal, natural gas, crude oil, refined oil 
products, and electricity), a composite of carbon-intensive commodities covered under the existing EU 
ETS, and important candidates for sectoral expansion, in particular transport activities. The remaining 
production of commodities and services is summarized in one aggregate sector; likewise private 
consumption patterns with associated carbon emissions are reflected in a composite final demand 
activity. The regions depicted for our analysis represent key players in the climate policy debate which 
may be seen as potential candidates for linking up with the EU ETS. 
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For the sectors and regions listed in Table 1 we generate marginal abatement cost functions through a 
sequence of hypothetical tax scenarios where we impose sector- and region-specific CO2 taxes starting 
from $0 to $100 per ton of CO2 in steps of $1 and then read off the CGE solution for the induced 
emission reduction. We then perform a least-square fit by a polynomial marginal abatement cost 
function of third degree to the set of “observations”:  
(10) 0 0 2 0 3, , , , , , , , , , ,( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( )= − + − + −i s i s i s i s i s i s i s i s i s i s i sMC e a e e a e e a e e  
where  
, ,( )i s i sMC e  denotes the marginal abatement cost of sector s in region i, 
0
,i se  is the business-as-usual emission level of sector s in region i,  
,i se  is the emission level of sector s in region i at a CO2 price equal to , ,( )i s i sMC e , and  
,1i sa , ,2i sa , ,3i sa are the fitted coefficients in the marginal abatement cost function of sector s in 
region i. 
 
Table 2: Business-as-usual emissions in 2020 and emission reduction pledges  
 2020 BaU emissions 
(in Mt CO2)
Reduction pledge 
(in % from 2020 BaU emissions)
EU-27 (EUR) 4450 25.4
USA (USA) 5982 17.1
Canada (CAN) 675 22.7
Japan (JPN) 1219 35.2
Russian Federation (RUS) 1945 7.7
Australia (AUS) 491 24.7
China (CHN) 9417 5.0
India (IND) 1783 5.0
Brazil (BRA) 543 17.1
Mexico (MEX) 466 17.1
South Africa (ZAF) 502 17.1
South Korea (KOR) 617 17.1
Rest of the World (ROW) 7338 5.0
 
Table 2 details projected business-as-usual (BaU) CO2 emissions in 2020 together with emission 
reduction targets from 2020 BaU levels across model regions. We have derived the post-Kyoto 
reduction pledges for 2020 from national communications following the Copenhagen Accord 
(UNFCCC, 2009), of which the 15th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework 
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Convention on Climate Change “took note”. The Copenhagen Accord requested Annex I countries to 
submit their “quantified economy-wide targets for 2020” and the non-Annex I countries to announce 
their “nationally appropriate mitigating actions”. All major economies of the world had submitted their 
pledges by spring 2010. The Appendix provides a detailed explanation on how we derived emission 
reductions targets for our model regions based on national communications to the Copenhagen 
Accord. 
4. Policy Scenarios and Results 
We use the numerical model to assess the prospects for expanding international emissions trading by 
regions and sectors.15 Regions thereby behave in a Cournot-Nash manner as they seek for a best-
response partitioning of their domestic emission ceilings between sectors that are covered through the 
ETS and the remaining sectors outside the ETS.  
 
With respect to regional ETS coverage, we begin from a core coalition comprising the EU and the 
USA as major climate policy players in the industrialized world (coalition C1). The first expansion 
includes in addition Japan, Canada and Australia – Annex 1 countries that have planned or already 
implemented emissions trading systems at the domestic level (coalition C2). The next coalition (C3) 
adds Russia and OECD regions South Korea and Mexico. Inclusion of the key non-Annex B regions 
Brazil, India, China, and South Africa is captured through coalition C4. Finally, full global coverage is 
achieved through the addition of ROW representing all other world regions (CE-World). We do not, 
however, consider strategic behavior by ROW, accounting for the heterogeneity and the large number 
of embodied countries. 
 
With respect to sectoral ETS coverage, we first consider the extreme case that no sector is included in 
the ETS. This setting is equivalent to exclusively domestic abatement without international emissions 
trading. In the next step (ELE) the power generation sector, which is by far the most important source 
of CO2 emissions across all countries, can trade emission allowances internationally. Variant EIS adds 
the other energy sectors and all energy-intensive industries to the ETS reflecting the current coverage 
of the ETS in Europe (i.e., sectors COL, CRU, GAS, OIL and EIS in Table 1). We then sequentially 
add CO2-intensive transport sectors (variants OTP and WTP) to the ETS, and furthermore consider the 
rest of industry (ROI) as a segment to be added to the ETS. The final addition to the ETS is made 
through final demand (variant C) which results in full coverage of domestic emissions by the ETS. In 
                                                     
15 The model code and the data to reproduce all simulation results are readily available from the corresponding author upon 
request. 
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this variant C there is no possibility to undertake strategic partitioning and we thus obtain the outcome 
of competitive emissions trading.  
 
Table 3: Regional and sectoral coverage of international emissions trading scenarios  
Regional coverage (coalitions) Sectoral coveragea 
No trade None  None 
C1 EU-27 + USA ELE ELE 
C2 C1 +  
(Japan, Canada, Australia) 
EIS ELE + 
COL, CRU, GAS, OIL, EIS 
C3 C2 +  
(Russia, South Korea, Mexico) 
OTP EIS + 
OTP  
C4 C3 +  
(China, India, Brazil, South Africa) 
WTP OTP + 
WTP 
CE-World All regions ROI WTP + 
ROI 
  C ROI + 
C 
a The variants of sectoral coverage are written in italics (e.g., OTP), whereas sectors are not (e.g., OTP). For 
instance, variant OTP comprises several sectors, where the OTP sector is the additional sector included in the 
ETS under this variant. Sectors are defined in Table 1. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the dimensionalities of (international) emissions trading scenarios with respect to 
regional and sectoral coverage. The sequence of expanding trading by sectors and regions is motivated 
by our view of a pragmatic climate policy course. Clearly, the numerical results for individual 
countries are dependent on this sequence but – as will follow from our interpretation below – the more 
general economic insights will still prevail. 
 
We report the implications of regional and sectoral expansion with respect to a no-trading scenario 
where each region complies with its specific emission reduction pledge through a domestic economy-
wide CO2 tax or likewise a comprehensive domestic cap-and-trade system without international 
emissions trading (this reference scenario corresponds to the settings “none” for regional coverage and 
“none” for sectoral coverage in Table 3 above).16  
 
                                                     
16 For the no-trading benchmark scenario the CO2 taxes, quota prices or likewise marginal abatement costs amount to (in 
USD per ton of CO2): EUR 75.5, USA 25.9, CAN 57.4, JPN 326.8, RUS 5.9, AUS 41.3, CHN 4.2, IND 4.7, BRA 95.7, MEX 
48.5, ZAF 8.5, KOR 30.4, and ROW 5.4. 
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Let us first consider the effects of regional expansion. Figure 4 shows how the costs of complying with 
the national target are reduced vis-à-vis the no-trading case when a country is part of a coalition, and 
how these cost reductions change as the coalition expands. Sectoral coverage is then kept constant at 
variant EIS which reflects the actual coverage of the EU ETS. We see for instance that U.S. costs are 
reduced by 20% when joining a coalition with the EU (C1), with the cost reduction growing to 53% 
when Canada, Japan and Australia are also included (C2). However, when even more countries are 
included, U.S. compliance costs start to increase, and in the largest coalition there are only rather 
modest gains vis-à-vis the autarky for the USA. The reasoning behind is that the quota price changes 
depending on who is part of the coalition – if the quota price then becomes close to the autarky quota 
price, there is little to gain from external trade. 
 
Note that Russia, China and India see their costs turn into a net gain when they join the international 
emissions trading scheme since the revenues from permit exports more than offset their abatement 
costs. The cost reductions for these countries in Figures 4, 7 and 8 are measured along the right-hand 
axis (RH). For instance, the cost reduction of 1800% for Russia under coalition C3 means that the 
abatement costs without international emissions trading have turned into a gain that is 17 times as 
large as the original costs (note that the latter are rather small).  
 
Figure 4: Accumulated cost reductions by expanding the coalition (variant EIS) 
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Figure 4 also illustrates that there will be opposite interests among current coalition members whether 
to invite new countries into the coalition or not. Again, this is related to the direction in which the 
quota price will change, and which countries are importers and which are exporters. For instance, the 
USA (exporter of quotas) will oppose new members after Canada, Japan and Australia are included, 
because this would drive down the quota price, whereas the other countries (importers of quotas) 
would like to include new members. Thus, it may be difficult to agree upon an expansion of the ETS 
in the direction of new coalition members. 
 
Figures 5 through 8 show – for a given coalition – how the costs are reduced when going from no-
trading to international permit trading between electricity sectors only, and then further expanding the 
sectoral coverage of the ETS. First, we see that the biggest cost reductions already occur when 
opening for permit trade through a sufficiently large emission-intensive sector such as the electricity 
sector (variant ELE). Nevertheless, there are still some cost reductions to be gained from expansion 
towards full coverage (C), indicating that there is some non-negligible strategic behavior. Aggregate 
costs are reduced by respectively 4%, 4%, 2% and 10% in coalitions C1, C2, C3 and C4 when going 
from ELE to full coverage. For individual countries such as Japan and Brazil, the cost reductions are 
even higher (16% and 19% in C4).  
 
Although cost savings usually increase with coverage, it is possible for countries to lose from sectoral 
expansion of the trading scheme, as pointed out in Section 2. For instance, in coalition C2, the USA 
loses when the two last sectors are added to the trading scheme (variants ROI and C). In coalition C3, 
the USA is best off with either only the electricity sector included (ELE) or with all sectors but final 
demand (variant ROI) included in the ETS. Several countries achieve their largest cost reductions (or 
their highest overall gains) when only ELE is included in the trading scheme. These are in particular 
Australia in coalition C2, and Russia, China, India and South Africa in coalition C4.  
 
The impacts of sectoral expansion are generally largest when the coalition is small (the strategic 
influence of a single country falls as the coalition expands). This is particularly evident from the 
approximately horizontal curves in Figure 7 (coalition C3) to the right of ELE. However, we notice 
some dramatic changes with the largest coalition in Figure 8, especially when we expand the ETS 
from ELE to EIS. In order to explain this, remember that China joins the coalition in C4. Chinese 
emissions are very large, with low abatement costs and only modest cutbacks (see Table 2). Thus, 
China is a dominant supplier of permits in C4, accounting for 77% of permit sales when all sectors are 
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included in the ETS. Hence, the country has significant strategic incentives to cut back on the sales of 
permits.  
 
Further, China’s strategic power declines substantially when expanding from ELE to EIS. The 
reasoning behind is that the energy-intensive sector in China has both large emissions and low 
abatement costs which warrants significant strategic power for the case that the energy-intensive 
sectors remain part of the non-trading segment (cf. section 2). As an indicator of this, Chinese exports 
of permits under ELE account for 69% of permit sales (versus 75-77% with more sectors included). 
We notice from Figure 8 that India, Russia and South Africa – all the three being permit exporters – 
gain relatively more than China as they can free ride on China’s export restraint which leads to 
relatively high permit price under ELE (see Figure 12 below). In absolute terms, however, China gains 
more than Russia and South Africa and almost as much as India. 
 
Figure 5: Accumulated cost reductions by adding more sectors (coalition C1) 
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Figure 6: Accumulated cost reductions by adding more sectors (coalition C2) 
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Figure 7: Accumulated cost reductions by adding more sectors (coalition C3) 
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Figure 8: Accumulated cost reductions by adding more sectors (coalition C4) 
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Figures 9 through 12 show how the ETS-price for the trading segment and the Non-ETS price (i.e., the 
marginal abatement costs) for the non-trading segment develop in the different coalitions when the 
sectoral coverage expands. First of all, we see that the ETS price increases when going from coalition 
C1 to C2, and then falls as we further expand towards coalitions C3 and C4. This is consistent with the 
changes in U.S. costs shown in Figure 4 – the USA is an exporter of quotas and therefore prefers 
higher quota prices. Furthermore, we notice that there are substantial differences in Non-ETS prices 
across countries within a coalition, revealing significant strategic behavior in all coalitions. For 
instance, in coalition C2 the Non-ETS price is more than two times higher in Japan and the EU than in 
the USA (under ELE). As expected, the Non-ETS prices converge towards each other and towards the 
ETS price as sectoral coverage expands.  
 
In Figure 12 we see that the Non-ETS price in Brazil is particularly high under ELE and then almost 
halved when expanding to EIS. The explanation for this is that Brazil has adopted quite ambitious 
emission reduction pledges and that its electricity sector has rather low emissions (compared to other 
countries). Hence, Brazil would prefer to allocate a negative number of permits to its ETS sector in 
order to reduce the marginal abatement costs in the non-trading segment. As we do not allow for 
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negative allocation in our simulations, the Non-ETS price for Brazil becomes particularly high under 
ELE. 
 
Finally, we observe that in all four coalitions with incomplete regional coverage (C1-C4) the ETS 
price falls when sectoral coverage expands. The exporters are thus more able to play strategically in 
order to raise the quota price compared to the cost-effective solution (i.e., under C when all sectors are 
included). This result echoes our theoretical prediction from Section 2, stating that exporters in general 
will tend to have stronger strategic power than importers. In addition, exporters tend to be bigger 
emitters than importers in our simulations (e.g., USA in C2, USA and RUS in C3 and CHN in C4). 
 
Figure 9: Non-ETS prices and ETS price (coalition C1) 
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Figure 10: Non-ETS prices and ETS price (coalition C2) 
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Figure 11: Non-ETS prices and ETS price (coalition C3) 
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Figure 12: Non-ETS prices and ETS price (C4) 
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Figure 13 shows how trade in allowances evolves under coalition C2 when sectoral coverage expands.  
 
Figure 13: Trade in allowances (coalition C2) 
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We notice that gross trade increases, or in other words: With only some sectors included, exporters 
have incentives to export fewer allowances in order to raise the price, whereas importers have 
incentives to import fewer allowances. This is especially true for big players, and we see that the USA 
changes trade volumes most, consistent with the change in ETS price discussed above. 
5. Conclusion 
Where-flexibility of emission abatement through international emissions trading is perceived as a 
crucial element of climate policy to reduce overall costs (and thereby increase political feasibility) of 
effective climate protection. In this vein, already the Kyoto Protocol dating back to 1997 calls for the 
use of flexible instruments.17 So far, however, cap-and-trade systems are regionally separated with the 
EU ETS being the only scheme where international emissions trading takes place across multiple 
jurisdictions. Apart from limited regional coverage, trading schemes are in general also restricted to 
energy-intensive industries in terms of sectoral coverage. As a prime example the EU ETS covers only 
around 40% of overall EU greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Given the limitations in regional and sectoral coverage of actual trading schemes there is broad 
consensus among climate policy makers to push for increased coverage in order to exploit the cost 
savings potentials of comprehensive where-flexibility. Yet, the feasibility of overall cost savings might 
be seriously hampered through opposed incentives from the perspective of individual countries. 
 
In this paper we have investigated the economic implications of regional and sectoral expansion of 
international emissions trading in a policy setting where individual countries are bound to emission 
reduction pledges under the Copenhagen Accords but incomplete sectoral coverage provides scope for 
strategic behavior to manipulate the international emission price. 
 
With our integrated theoretical and applied analysis we shed some light on the economic incentives at 
stake when climate policy makers contemplate the regional linkage and sectoral expansion of emission 
trading regimes. 
 
As to regional expansion our results illustrate that the interests of quota exporters and importers are 
usually opposed when including more countries into the trading scheme. The exporters would like to 
                                                     
17 With regard to where-flexibility the Kyoto Protocol allows for the use of three flexible instruments: (i) international 
emissions trading (IET) between Annex B countries; (ii) joint implementation (JI) between Annex B countries; and (iii) the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) between Annex B countries and non-Annex B countries. 
30 
let in more potential importers, which would raise the quota price, while the importers would like to 
let in more potential exporters to depress the quota price. 
  
When expanding sectoral coverage for a given trading coalition of countries, the highest cost 
reductions generally come from the first step: going from “No trade” to a trading scheme that includes 
one sector with a sufficiently large emission share (in our case: the electricity sector). When sectoral 
coverage is expanded, a country usually gains, however we identify several cases in our numerical 
simulations where countries lose. This happens because sectoral expansion makes the marginal 
abatement costs in the remaining non-trading segment of these countries less elastic, so that they are 
less able to manipulate the quota price in their preferred direction. The USA and Russia are the 
countries that most frequently experience a loss from sectoral expansion of the trading scheme. 
 
The economic impacts of sectoral expansion are more substantial when the coalition is small, because 
an individual country has more market power in a smaller coalition. However, including China into 
the coalition means that a particularly large player joins the carbon market, implying significant 
strategic effects if the trading scheme only covers the electricity sector. Sectoral expansion reduces the 
quota price in all our simulations, consistent with our theoretical prediction. This implies that – as a 
group – exporters have more market power than importers, but their influence decreases when more 
sectors are added to the scheme. 
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Appendix: Specification of emission reduction targets 
In this appendix, we explain how we have transformed the Copenhagen pledges for 2020 to effective 
reductions in emissions from their 2020 business-as-usual (BaU) levels (cf. Table 2).  
 
As shown in Table A1, most of our model regions have stated their pledges in terms of an absolute 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Only China and India have adopted pledges in relative terms, 
promising to reduce their emissions per unit of GDP. The base year from which the reduction should 
be measured varies from 1990 to 2020 (business-as-usual).  
 
Six regions have provided a range of emission reduction targets. As a general rule, we choose the 
lower bound of the range. For Russia, China and India, however, the lower bound does not require any 
emission reduction in 2020. We therefore use the upper bound of the range instead. For China and 
India, even the higher bound of their Copenhagen pledge would not require any emission reduction 
compared to BaU in 2020. Here we take the view that these countries would come under pressure from 
other countries to at least undertake some effective emission reduction, which we set at 5% below 
BaU emission levels. We also assume that the countries that we do not model individually (the rest of 
the world) would reduce emissions by on average 5%. 
 
In contrast to China and India, the other developing countries that we model have made very 
ambitious pledges committing them to larger emission reductions than most OECD countries. We 
argue that these pledges are not particularly credible. Thus, we replace them by the percentage 
reduction of the OECD country with the weakest target (in percentage terms compared to 2020 BaU 
emissions) –the USA with a reduction target of 17.1%. 
 
Note that Table A1 shows the calculated emission reductions according to the Copenhagen pledges, 
i.e., before our adjustments. Our adjusted emission reduction pledges that we use in the model 
simulations are shown in Table 2 in the main text. In our numerical simulations we only capture CO2 
emissions, thereby assuming that the CO2 emission reductions will be proportional to the overall 
greenhouse gas emission reductions. 
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Table A1: Calculation of emission reduction targets based on Copenhagen pledges 
Region Reduction 
pledge 
Variable Base year Base year 
value
2020 BaU 
value 
2020 
reduction
EURl 20 – 30% GHG 1990 4149 4450 1131
USA 17% GHG 2005 5975 5982 1023
CAN 17% GHG 2005 629 675 153
JPN 25% GHG 1990 1054 1219 429
RUSu 15 – 25% GHG 1990 2393 1945 150
AUSl 5 – 25% GHG 2000 359 464 123
CHNu 40 – 45% GHG/GDP 2005 2.428 1.323 0
INDu 20 – 25% GHG/GDP 2005 1.480 0.827 0
BRAl 36.1–38.9% GHG BaU 543 543 196
MEX 30% GHG BaU 466 466 140
ZAF 34% GHG BaU 502 502 171
KOR 30% GHG BaU 617 617 185
Sources: EIA (2009), UNFCCC (2010a,b) 
Notations: 
l: Lower bound of the reduction pledge range;  
u: Upper bound of the reduction pledge range 
Variable: GHG = Greenhouse gas emissions; GHG/GDP = Greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP 
Base year: BaU = 2020 business-as-usual 
Base year value, 2020 BaU value: Mt CO2/GDP in billion 2005 USD for CHN, IND; Mt CO2 for all other regions 
2020 reduction: Mt CO2 
 
 
